

SUMMARIES



Rituale im Militär – Funktion, Fallstricke und Führungsverantwortung

Hubert Annen, Florian Schnugg

Denkt man im militärischen Bereich an Rituale, kommen einem wohl als erstes Appelle oder Zeremonien in den Sinn, die einem standardisierten, meist feierlichen Ablauf folgen und öffentlich stattfinden. Es handelt sich hierbei um Demonstrationen von Einheit oder Macht, die auf der Makroebene verortet sind. Militärische Initiationsrituale hingegen sind auf der Mikroebene angesiedelt und nicht immer öffentlich. Wenn sie im Nachhinein dennoch an die mediale Öffentlichkeit gelangen, deutet das darauf hin, dass die ursprüngliche Zielsetzung der Identitäts- und Sicherheitsstiftung verfehlt und menschliche und militärische Werte verletzt worden sind.

Angesichts des betreffenden Gefahrenpotenzials behandelt der vorliegende Beitrag im Anschluss an eine allgemeine Definition von Begriff und Bedeutung vornehmlich militärische Rituale auf der Mikroebene. Dabei wird deren generelle Funktion dargelegt sowie auf mögliche Fallstricke und typische, ungünstige Mechanismen bei deren Umsetzung aufmerksam gemacht. Davon ausgehend werden Ansätze aufgezeigt, wie Führungskräfte heikle Elemente und unerwünschte Auswüchse frühzeitig erkennen und unter Wahrnehmung ihrer Führungsverantwortung zielgerichtet Einfluss nehmen können und müssen.

Wargames – A Viable Research Method?

Lauri Teppo

This article provides an overview of the use of operational-tactical level wargames as a research method. Wargames can be described as simulations of war or battle, where the results are a consequence of the decisions of individual players. Although there is a wide variety of wargames, this article focuses on rigid operational-tactical wargames.

The author outlines the following main components of a wargame: force composition, force capabilities, geographical environment, the decision-making environment for players, the rules of the game and analysis. A process to determine force capabilities (i.e., mobility, protection and firepower) was described through the concept developed in the author's master's thesis.

In the conventional framework, the success of the battle or operation is usually based on the status of the three operational factors controlled by the opposing players: time, space and forces. In addition to that, this article introduces another tool, used in the author's research project, to determine the success of an operation. However, the success criteria of non-conventional operations (e.g., counter-insurgency) may be different and as such, may need specific measurement tools.

The outcoming data from wargames are usually of qualitative nature. To illustrate that aspect, the article provides an overview of the data collection and analysis methods used in the author's research (including coding guidance).

The author puts forward an argument that analytical wargames can be used for the purposes of conducting research in operational and tactical matters by using mainly qualitative research design. However, such research methodology entails careful determination of unit characteristics (i.e., mobility, protection, firepower).

The article ends with a short overview of using wargames for analysing and modelling tactical processes and force development, and also as a supplementary instrument for operation analysis formulas. In addition, a brief description of the method's strengths and weaknesses is provided.

Improving Reservist Refresher Training: Feedback from Wartime Company Commanders on Refresher Training Exercise „Okas“

Robert Kase, Aivar Pilv, Svetlana Ganina

This article provides an overview of the insights provided by wartime company commanders for the purposes of improving the overall quality of refresher training offered to reservists. To that end, two research questions were formulated:

- 1) What are the main problems reported by wartime company commanders with regard to the organisation of training provided to reservists in the framework of refresher training exercises?

- 2) What kinds of activities and procedures do wartime company commanders recommend adopting in order to ensure the quality of training provided to reservists in the framework of refresher training exercises?

The research was based on interviews with company commanders who had taken part in the *Okas* refresher training exercises in 2017 and 2018, and were engaged in the planning or conducting of training during the exercises in question. The data was analysed using qualitative inductive content analysis. The article covers both the main problems reported and the solutions offered to those problems.

In order to answer the first research question (regarding the main problems with the organisation of reservist refresher training exercises), the authors conducted a survey, which found that the training provided to reservists in the framework of refresher training exercises was not prepared or conducted at the level of quality expected by either commanders or reservists. Thus, the results indicate that the main problems are directly related to the preparation and planning of such training.

Furthermore, the results also indicated that while some problem areas do not fall under the purview of company commanders, their poor quality nevertheless affected the other processes managed by company commanders (e.g. the clarity of the message contained in the call to training sent to the reservists; the arrival of the reservists to the battalion and the related administrative activities, etc.). According to the interviewees, the main problems were the lack of training guidance and that training objectives were not prepared or poorly prepared. For example, some commanders pointed out that the battalion had not formulated specific training objectives for the training, or that the main objective was not clearly understandable. However, the company commanders themselves had also failed to set training objectives for themselves; if they had done so, it could have contributed to some extent to the improvement of the overall quality of the training exercise.

The answers to the second research question (regarding the kinds of activities and procedures that should be adopted to ensure the quality of reservist refresher training exercises), demonstrated that the use of available peace-time resources for war-time activities should be made less complicated; training topics need to be prioritised; and training materials should be specially adapted for refresher training exercises and tailored specifically for reservists. In addition, any changes related to equipment and technology should not be forgotten in the planning process. The lack of instructors was also mentioned among the reported problems, and that problem was solved

by recruitment of reservists. Since that solution proved viable, and in order to improve the competence of reservist instructors in the future, the company commanders proposed that the Estonian Defence Forces should consider engaging those reservists as assistant trainers or providing opportunities for work shadowing in the process of training conscripts. Maintaining closer contact with reservists was also considered important. Actually, some company commanders have already begun implementing some of these recommendations. With regard to the problems related to the arrival of reservists to assembly areas, the company commanders pointed out that although they are unable to influence this process as such, they can, however, direct the platoon and squad level commanders to consider formation as a matter of priority, in order to engage them in the training process at the first opportunity.

The results also indicate that while the participants place high value on the quality of training, currently, there is no systematic approach in place to ensure that. Although company commanders do not implement quality management principles, the research showed that the elements addressed in Oakland's¹ total quality management model would be useful to adopt for the purposes of achieving that goal. In addition, compliance with NATO's SAT (*Systems Approach to Training*) model, continuous assessment and self-assessment could also help prevent the problems identified by the interviewees.

In conclusion, this article highlights the problems and bottlenecks that company commanders should take into account when planning, preparing and providing training in the framework of reservist refresher training exercises. In addition, the article also covers recommendations on how to prevent and avoid these problems in the future.

Further research is warranted on the topics of setting training objectives and choosing priority topics by company commanders in the planning and preparation stages of these training exercises. Another point of inquiry could be to specify the quality requirements for training materials to be prepared specifically for reservists and how to modify existing training materials so that they could be used by reservist officers and non-commissioned officers in the process of teaching and training their own units. Furthermore, the possibilities of involving reservists as instructors in the training of conscripts should also be explored.

¹ **Oakland, J. S.** 2014. *Total Quality Management and Operational Excellence*, 4th Edition. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

Threshold Concepts for and by Smaller Forces

Jaan Murumets

This article addresses the problem of how a smaller country could increase its threshold defence to the maximum degree within the limits of affordability.

The article provides an overview of a conceptual analysis of six possible dimensions (or functions) of a threshold defence, highlighting the role of deterrence and of resilience, and the importance of creating favourable conditions for allies or partners to come to assistance. The discussion focuses on what to deter and how to achieve such deterrence, as well as how to assess what would constitute effective deterrence on the part of a small power *vis-à-vis* a larger adversary. In this context, the importance of knowing and correctly assessing the adversary is highlighted as *a sine qua non*. In addition, the article also outlines and discusses two alternative ways of increasing the chances of timely assistance from allies / partners: (a) by deliberately escalating and raising the intensity of the conflict in order to improve the prospects for a timely reaction by allies or partners (“Punch Back Hard”), and (b) by drawing out the conflict so as to gain time for allied decision-making and deployments (“Protect the Skeleton”).

Generic planning tools were utilised to link the concept of conventional threshold to policy-making and defence planning processes. First, assumptions about the policy and planning context of the application of the conventional threshold concept were established. Then, a simplified generic format of policy guidance was used to outline the government objectives, desired political and military end states, desired effects to influence enemy calculus, derived military missions, and applicable constraints and restraints for both strategies. After that, broad tasks were identified across a generic construct of services and key branches, i.e., special forces, land, air, maritime, electronic warfare / cyber-warfare, and strategic communications. The last step entailed the identification of military capabilities required to carry out the tasks and missions within the policy framework established above. Two NATO documents – *Capability Hierarchy of 2015*, and *Capability Codes and Capability Statements of 2016* – were used as reference. Finally, both strategies were assessed against the six functions of a threshold, with a brief discussion of strengths and weaknesses, and the development of preliminary findings.

The analysis indicates that the force needed to implement the threshold strategy codenamed “Protect the Skeleton” would need to deploy relatively

more infantry units, and less and lower technology weapon systems and platforms; whereas the force needed to implement the “Punch Back Hard” strategy would need to deploy less infantry, but more and higher technology systems and platforms. In terms of the required military capabilities there is considerable overlap; however, the main difference lies in the fact that capabilities for the “Punch Back Hard” strategy would lean more on longer range indirect fire, and deploy a more developed air dimension, and higher mobility.

The comparison against the six functions of the Threshold Concept demonstrates that both strategies are virtually equal in regard to the Trip Wire and Barrier functions. While the “Punch Back Hard” strategy fares somewhat better in the Alarm Bell function, as a Marker, it is clearly superior to the “Protect the Skeleton” strategy. Against the Defence function, both strategies are satisfactory; although the “Protect the Skeleton” strategy fared somewhat better, provided there is enough time to conduct the call-up and integration of reserve elements. In providing the Deterrent function, though, the “Punch Back Hard” strategy performs clearly better than “Protect the Skeleton”.

In conclusion, this first cut study shows that the emerging concept of conventional threshold is applicable within, and using the tools of, Western defence planning methods. Specifically, as assessed against the functions of threshold, the “Punch Back” strategy appears to fare generally better than the ‘Protect the Skeleton’ strategy, while also being clearly superior in providing deterrence.

The European Union’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in the Area of Security and Defence Policy – A Threat or Asset to Estonia’s Security Policy?

Philipp Ainso

This article focuses on the main internal and external factors that have shaped the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union and sets those factors in the context of the transatlantic security architecture and EU-US relations. The European Union’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is analysed as the current primary embodiment of the CSDP which has the potential to significantly change the nature of transatlantic relations. Although it is too early to predict if those changes will

be positive or negative, it is nevertheless feasible to model the most likely alternative trajectories of PESCO's possible future development and their probable impact. Drawing on the historical accounts of the CSDP, the article begins with outlining the central components of the PESCO (i.e., the battle-groups, military command, capability development, military capabilities, defence industry and the interests of the member states) that help explain the potential of the EU's renewed Global Strategy to achieve its goals and ambitions. In the most comprehensive sense, the question is whether we will see the continuance of the prevailing type of intergovernmental cooperation (i.e., drawing on the national defence policies of sovereign member states), or whether the EU will decide to opt for the supranationalist route (i.e. by pooling the sovereign defence policies of its individual member states). Thus, in the most general terms, the potential of the components could be characterized by either supranational or intergovernmental traits, which should reveal their overall impact in the PESCO development scenarios generated in the course of this research.

The article outlines five possible future trajectories for PESCO based on the inner potential of the components mentioned above and on the possible future scenarios developed for the CSDP by Andersson *et al.* (2016)². These five scenarios provide a meaningful context for understanding the possible (re)positioning of the EU in the transatlantic security architecture, enabling the detection of potential risks and opportunities. The latter will, in turn, enable gaining a better understanding of PESCO's implications for Estonia's security policy.

Finally, the article outlines the main risks associated with the PESCO as the potential for wasting NATO resources, the security policy risks inherent in restricting products originating from the US defence industry, the prevalence of inefficient niche capabilities and the type of rhetoric that can cause the deterioration of the allied relationship. The author considers PESCO's main opportunities to be increased standardization among NATO partners, expanded cooperation with third countries, development of civil support services and facilities for the purposes of military defence, the complementing of NATO's functions as well as the strengthening and diversifying of Estonia's partnerships within the Alliance.

² Andersson, J. J. *et al.* 2016. *Envisioning European defence. Five futures.* – Chaillot Papers, No. 137, March. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.

Amphibious Assault as a Potential Threat to Estonia

Grigori Gavrilov

Estonia's geopolitical location is the primary underlying factor dictating the country's defence policy. Although all three Baltic states are connected to their fellow NATO allies in Europe via sea lines of communication, their only land connection with continental Europe is the vulnerable 65-kilometers long Suwałki Gap on the border between Lithuania and Poland. However, due to the physical geography of Estonia's shoreline and rather considerable deficiencies in the ability to defend its interests at sea, Estonia's high value targets are exposed to amphibious assault. It is particularly alarming considering that the Russian Federation is in possession of a rather formidable naval force in the region and also maintains a rather large, although outmoded, amphibious force. Furthermore, Russia's repeated attempts to modernise its amphibious fleet indicate that the strategic utility of power projection from the sea is not lost upon Russia's military and civilian leadership.

Although there are few current sources on how Russian joint forces would conduct a contemporary amphibious assault, it is still possible to predict the most likely course of action due to the high dependence of its naval landing force on the technical features of their ships and vehicles. Considering that most of the hardware of Russia's landing force is Soviet-made or Soviet-derived, it is likely that their tactics have not changed much. Thus, it is safe to presume that the Russian Federation would most likely conduct an amphibious landing by taking guidance from Soviet-era tactics deploying a combination of helicopter and ship-borne assault force up to brigade-size, comprising both naval infantry and motorized rifle units. In such a scenario, the naval infantry would secure the beachhead in order to enable the main force to land and advance further inland. Consequently, it is paramount to survey the terrain in the area of interest from two aspects: (a) whether or not it supports the establishment of a beachhead of a predetermined size and (b) if that beachhead would allow for further inland advance.

In case of armed conflict, having a great number of vitally important targets that are not secured from a sea approach, facilitates swift advance on the part of the assaulting amphibious force, thus creating a *fait accompli* situation, which would be desirable from the Russian standpoint in case of a hypothetical conventional conflict with the Baltic countries. The scenario described above, in conjunction with the fact that the Russian Federation still maintains a credible power projection capability from the sea, leads one

to believe that the threat of amphibious assault against Estonia is not only technically possible but also operationally feasible.

Alumni Shadowing Project at the Estonian Military Academy: Faculty Feedback on its Effect on Professional Development

Svetlana Ganina

The article provides an overview and an analysis of action research conducted in the framework of the alumni shadowing project implemented at the Estonian Military Academy (EMA).

Participation in the alumni shadowing project provided an opportunity for the EMA's faculty members to gain insights into the actual professional duties of EMA alumni by way of direct communication and on-site visits. Interviews with participating EMA faculty members and notes from the journal of the project's coordinator were used as primary input data. For the purposes of this research, alumni were defined as students who had recently graduated from the EMA, and who had gone into active service with the Estonian Defence Forces after graduation.

This article provides an overview of research conducted in the framework of this project that focused on the following three research questions:

- 1) How do faculty members define their professional development?
- 2) How do faculty members describe the effects of participating in the alumni shadowing project on their professional development?
- 3) What were the problems encountered by the faculty in the course of this project?

The research indicates that the EMA's teaching staff needs to gain a better understanding of the organisation's perspective regarding their professional development, enabling them to plan their development more efficiently in the long run.

The results showed that participation in the alumni shadowing project increased awareness among the teaching staff regarding the actual service duties performed by EMA alumni, providing an impetus to revisit and review the contents and methodology of the courses they teach at the EMA.

Furthermore, results indicate that the faculty members found that participation in this type of project provides an invaluable opportunity to support

their professional development in the areas of specialised professional knowledge and teaching methodology.

Therefore, we can conclude that participation in this type of alumni shadowing project could support the professional development of the teaching staff. However, this process seems to be effective only if faculty members understand the process of their professional development and how it affects the larger organisation.

Alumni shadowing seems to be especially beneficial if the teaching staff and the alumni who take part in such programmes have a clear shared understanding of their respective roles. Other contributing factors to the success of the project seem to be the establishment of mutual trust between the paired-up teacher and the alumnus, as well as the formulation of detailed professional development strategies for each member of the organisation's faculty.