

## SUMMARIES IN ENGLISH



### **The Effect of Environment in Supporting Conscripts' Adaptation**

*Karel Kattai, Kristjan Kask*

The main goal of this study is to identify what factors influence a conscript's adaptation to their environment during their service in the Defence Forces. As a result suggestions will be made as to what improvements can be made to the environment. In order to achieve this goal, 72 representatives from different units were interviewed. The interviews took place in 2014. The results indicate that some of the important factors that impede accommodation or adaptation include lack of information for conscripts, lack of privacy, the absence of friends and family members, the motivation, behaviour, and attitude of some of the superiors and instructors towards the conscripts, and the fact that the different abilities of the conscripts are not taken into consideration. In general, the environment is supportive for conscripts serving in the Defence Forces and for those conducting their service. It is important that conscripts who arrive in a new environment receive adequate information about what is expected of them during their time in the service. They should be granted adequate living conditions, and feel that they are requisite to the Defence Forces. Likewise they should feel valued and supported while they are adapting and during their active service.

### **Prediction of Factors of Job Performance Success, Using the Example of the 14<sup>th</sup> Basic Officer Training Course**

*Ivo Silbaum, Kersti Kõiv*

The aim of this study is to propose a uniform basis for the appraisal of job performance of cadets based on the analysis of five factors that influence job performance. This is an empirical study. The data was gathered from the 14<sup>th</sup> BOTC (2010 – 2015), and then analysed using various statistical analysis methods (factor analysis, regression, correlation and average comparison).

Based on the result of the analysis it was found that the weighted average grade had a success rate of 12.2% in predicting future job performance, but could not predict the consolidated results. It also became evident that of the five factors, the best predictor of successful future job performance was the assessment of leadership qualities by fellow students. The study focused more on the construct of the task performance than it did on the contextual performance. Finally, it was found that the results of the general physical test were most closely connected to motivation. However, due to the fact that it is impossible to use the results of the general physical test to predict the success of future job performance or any of its constructs in a statistically relevant way, a proposal was made to exclude the results of the general physical test from the assessment criteria, or rather to use it as a form of non-differentiated assessment. Furthermore, it was discovered that the degree of participation in extra-curricular activities is solely connected to task performance, and had a predictive success rate of 11%.

The results of the analysis proved that the results from the “discipline” category are closely connected to task performance and loosely connected to the success of future job performance as well as to the motivation construct. By itself the discipline result had a predictive rate of 16.1% for successful future job performance. In addition, the regression analysis of the collected results of the five factors, and the success of future job performance showed that when compiling a ranking to appraise a cadet’s job performance, the general proposal should only be comprised of an **assessment of leadership qualities by fellow cadets**. When taken separately this is the best predictor of a platoon leader’s job performance success and when combined with the collected results of all constructs it becomes diluted within the other factors and does not form a model. Counterarguments were also found, and approximate relative importance of the factors was calculated by weighing. In the event that the leadership assessment of students of the ENDC would remain unchanged, a proposal was made to use a ranking method to determine relative importance when compiling an appraisal of cadet job performance success. For the final result, the leadership assessment would form 57%, the discipline factor 28%, the weighted average grade 8%, and the activeness of participating in extra-curricular activities 7%.

## Teaching Methods Used in the Training Course of the Conscript-Based Non-Commissioned Officers

*Madis Amer, Svetlana Ganina*

Today's security environment changes frequently, so it is essential that leaders are able to act according to a higher purpose, make decisions independently, take initiative, and be ready to cooperate with allies. Leaders must be flexible and cope with different, and unfamiliar situations. To achieve this, training must be student-centered. It is necessary to find the right balance between teaching the skills and developing a cadet's cognitive abilities. Using certain teaching methods is the easiest way to achieve this. Therefore, the present thesis focuses on studying the application of the most common teaching methods used in the Estonian Defence Forces, and seeks to ascertain the degree of awareness of these methods.

The study tries to answer the following questions:

- 1) What are the teaching methods known by the instructors of the NCO training course?
- 2) Which methods are used most commonly?
- 3) What is the choice of these methods based on?

To attain this goal relevant literature and research were studied. The first part of the study describes the teaching methods most commonly used in the Estonian Defence Forces and then highlights their positive and negative aspects. The second part presents the main results of the study.

To achieve this, a questionnaire consisting of nine questions, including open-ended questions and multiple-choice questions was administered. The questionnaire was electronically designed and sent out to active servicemen who had taken part or were taking part in NCO courses.

The second part of the study focuses on the results of the analysis of the questionnaire. A table has been drawn to present the reasons and factors that affect the instructors' choice of teaching methods for the NCO courses. Another table shows the number of instructors employing each specific method in their teaching of different subjects.

The study reveals that the training of NCOs is teacher-centered. This extends to conscript training as well, because if officer training does not facilitate the development of cognitive skills, independence, initiative, situational perception, analytical thinking, and enhance decision-making abilities and overall responsibility, then basic training certainly will not either.

Based on the findings, it is suggested that more student-centered teaching methods be used in NCO training. This will enable the development of cognitive skills of the leaders of small units. In addition, it will also make possible the development of the above-mentioned leadership skills such as independence, initiative, decision-making ability, etc.

Furthermore, instructor courses should also develop an awareness of different teaching methods in order to afford instructors an ability to utilize the most suitable teaching methods for a specific training.

Further studies are recommended in the following areas:

- Informed choice of teaching methods,
- Teaching methods that promote leaders' independence, analytical thinking, decision-making ability, responsibility, initiative and perception of a situation,
- Ways of applying the teaching methods to develop cognitive skills during conscript training,
- The suitability of the teaching methods for students.

### **Formation of National Military Units Within the Red Army, 1918–1922**

*Igor Kopõtin*

The Red Army Armed Forces were formed in 1918 to achieve the revolutionary aims of the Russian Communist Party. Among other things, the Red Army became the tool of the Communist Party to destroy the class-based society in the country. This was the reason for forming the Red Army based on social classes. Unlike regular armed forces, the Red Army preferred to recruit the proletariat – peasants and working class people. As a general rule, the enemies of the proletariat – noblemen and the bourgeoisie were allowed to serve in the Red Army as specialists in a certain field. Due to the fact that Russia remained a multinational country after the revolution in 1917, the question arose as to how representatives of other ethnic groups living in Russia were involved in military service and what their role was.

The disposition of the Bolsheviks toward the formation of national military units within the Russian tsarist army was negative. However, they got into a difficult situation as the civil war escalated in the spring of 1918. This required the formation of solid military units to be used to suppress numerous riots and fight against the counter-revolutionary minded White Guard

units. The Latvian Red Riflemen units should be highlighted for their exceptional loyalty to the Red Army and high efficiency in combat. Estonian Rifleman units were also relatively efficient in combat.

The Russian Civil War spread throughout the whole territory of the country, involving nations from Ukraine to the Far-East, from the Caucasus to Northern Russia. In Ukraine, the situation became relatively difficult, as there were several parties fighting against one another. However, the Bolsheviks succeeded in gaining Ukrainian communists known as *borotbists* as their allies, and, as a result, got the local people on their side. At first the Ukrainian national units within the Red Army were formed based on Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine – Tshernigov, Harkov and Donbas, the biggest of them being the Red Cossacks Corps.

Among the peoples of the North-Caucasus, the Bolsheviks achieved success by effectively exploiting the traditional controversies among these peoples, and alternately supporting different small ethnic groups. As a result, several irregular units were formed in the region, which kept fighting in their home region. Although it was Stalin's plan to form a mountain division to be sent to the Polish front, ultimately no sizable units were formed in the region. The formation of the Transcaucasian national military units from 1920–22 was based on the reorganization of existing military units.

The activity of the national military units of the Bashkirs, Tatars, Udmurts and Tsvavshs within the Red Army turned out to be relatively successful in the years 1919–1920. By successfully exploiting the inflexible ethnic policy of the Russian Whites, the Bolsheviks managed to get the armed formations of Bashkiria and Tatar pursuing ethnic autonomy on their side. Their high motivation made them highly efficient in the battlefield. The combat activity of the Volga-Tatar division against their Muslim coreligionists in Turkestan should be highlighted.

However, the Bolsheviks completely failed with recruiting and winning the local people in Turkestan. The reasons for that included not only the Bolsheviks' ignorance of ethnic tradition, but also the fact that in the Russian Empire the Turkestan people were freed from military service, and therefore had no experience with it. Mobilization in the Red Army in 1920 provoked the resistance of locals, and therefore the formation of national military units was difficult and the bulk of the units were formed of Russians.

In conclusion, the Bolsheviks managed to form several dozen national military units within the Red Army by successfully exploiting the disorganization of ethnic minorities and the short-sightedness of the Russian ethnic

minority policy. These units demonstrated relatively high efficiency in the fronts of the Civil War.

### **The Concept of Individual Soldier Readiness for Combat Based on Wolf Graf von Baudissin**

*Claus Freiherr von Rosen*

Combat power and fighting power (*Kriegs- und Kampftüchtigkeit*) are terms that are obvious in the armed forces and therefore they are hardly mentioned in the regulations and manuals of the Bundeswehr. However, in the 1950s, when the Bundeswehr was being established, the main issue discussed was whether future German soldiers should be able to fight in combat or they should be trained to defend peace and democratic core values in accordance with the ideas of leadership development and civic education (*Innere Führung*). The ideas of Wolf Graf von Baudissin, the developer of the concepts of the Bundeswehr *Innere Führung*, clearly indicate that combat power and fighting power do not involve only the formal properties of a military organization, in other words its physical and material „hardware”. Rather, the above domains comprise the „software” of an organization, involving its norms, attitude and readiness. This means the readiness and willingness of an individual soldier for combat and the ability to keep fighting, if necessary, to the death. Thus these concepts entail the core values of an individual – both then and today. This is an important part in educating „a soldier with high values, determined in his goals, able to handle his weapon, and mentally ready to respond rapidly”.

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