

SUMMARIES



Motivational Aspects in Conscript Training and Their Impact on Learning Outcomes and Attrition

Mario Lementa, Ülle Säälük, Aivar Ots, Inga Karton

The objective of this study is to longitudinally explain the coherence between a perception of autonomy, self-efficacy, appreciation of training and desire to quit, as well as the ways in which these motivational aspects affect learning outcomes and early inclusion in the reserve forces in the course of a soldiers' basic course. The study was conducted in 2019 in the Kuperjanov Infantry Battalion; data was gathered from 321 conscripts twice during the soldiers' basic course; the average age of respondents was 19.9 years, whereas 1.56% of them were female. The motivational aspects perceived during training were determined with an electronic questionnaire and the learning outcomes were determined according to the results of the soldiers' basic course exam; the proportion of conscripts leaving the service ahead of time was an indication of the attrition rate according to the administrative data. Analysis was conducted with Structural Equation Modelling method, including Cross Lagged Panel Model and Mediation Analysis.

The hypotheses of the study were, to a large extent, confirmed: conscripts' perception of autonomy positively influenced their self-efficacy and negatively their intention to quit. Moreover, a greater perception of autonomy is positively related with the training outcomes of conscripts and negatively with an early inclusion in the reserve forces. Autonomy perceived earlier in the training, however, was not related with a subsequent appreciation of training.

The study has some constraints such as a limited generalisation of the results in the example of a single unit or an exclusion of other potential aspects (learning environment or other) that might have an impact. Despite the constraints, the results of the study are valuable since they provide new knowledge about the validity of general education findings in the context of military training of conscripts in the Estonian Defence Forces. Recruiting is quite restricted for the Defence Forces. Since conscription is in constant competition with other spheres of life, conscripts must be trained with contemporary

educational methods to increase their motivation to contribute into Estonian national defence.

The study revealed that a perception of autonomy, self-efficacy, and valuing training are important interrelated motivational traits. A single motivational aspect may not give the desired result; thus, in order to get conscripts to dedicate to training, motivational traits must be used in a combination, whereas the perception of autonomy is of considerable importance.

For further applications and research, the measuring instrument could be used as a monitoring tool. It is important to conduct longitudinal studies with a variety of durations over a longer period of time in order to collect more valuable and generalisable data. This way, the instructors and trainers could gather information on how to improve certain techniques in order to teach conscripts more efficiently and support their motivation to learn, at the same time offering a potential life choice to those interested in a career in the Defence Forces and as reservists.

The Principles of Life Cycle Costing of the Assets of the Defence Forces

Marek Mardo

The objective of this article is to introduce the fundamentals and basic elements of life cycle costing. Collecting historical and theoretical background information, including the development process of life cycle costing is essential in the Defence Forces because it helps to recognise the importance of assets and benefits that the organisation may gain. The concept of life cycle costing got wider attention in the mid-sixties when the US Department of Defence (DoD) acknowledged that a mere justification of lowest price tendering on governmental procurement programmes is misleading. The DoD found themselves in a situation where financial resources for maintaining the equipment were starting to run out and the funds assigned for acquiring new equipment needed to be reallocated to compensate for the deficiency. The administration of President Kennedy ordered the Logistic Management Institute to establish the methods and principles of life cycle costing. Consequently, the theory and practices of life cycle costing got transferred to major industrial countries and used as a basis for establishing national rules. Although life cycle costing is considered an interdisciplinary

subject that combines the practices of management, engineering, and finance, its primary area of support is financial accounting.

Why is life cycle costing essential? Defence equipment is designed for specific purposes and probably not for mass production. These systems are complex; they contain high-tech components and require constant modifications during their entire lifespan which can last for up to fifty years. Considering all that, the life cycle cost estimation process is complicated, involving elements of risk and uncertainties, and, therefore, considered a challenge for analysts. Undertaking life cycle costing helps to identify key cost drivers and provide better insight of expenses related with program planning and budgeting. When done properly, life cycle costing is considered the best means for assessing affordability and managing the budget, estimating expenditures, analysing defence capabilities and evaluating procurement tenders. From a long-term perspective, cost estimation will enable to assess the expense and benefit options of national income and expenditure affordability based on future cash flows and a transfer of payments.

Life cycle costing as a subject has gotten little attention on a national level. In Estonia, only a few articles have been published and some research done. According to the National Audit Office, the annual report on life cycle costs in governmental procurements have been a selection criterion in the past few years but the procurements examined in the auditing process failed to show how exactly were life cycle costs determined and assessed in acquisitions. Most of the procurements only showed the decisions made according to the cost; life cycle costing was not a determining factor in the decision-making process in any of the procurements analysed. Therefore, life cycle costing on a national level would require further research.

Future Maritime Defence Scenarios in Estonia

Tauri Roosipuu

The problems of organising Estonian maritime defence have been the topic of discussion ever since the country restored independence, but not yet acknowledged on a governmental and societal level, and no substantial reorganisations have been made so far. The objective of this article is to propose two hypothetical and extreme future scenarios that could take place over the next thirty years, both positive and negative, based on the current

situation of maritime defence in Estonia. The first (the black scenario) is based on the assumption that there will be negative developments over the next decades, and maritime defence in Estonia will significantly deteriorate. However, the second (the white scenario) is based on the opposite assumption: a positive development will follow and Estonian maritime defence will dramatically improve.

The organisation of maritime defence in Estonia is at a crossroads. It is not sustainable in its current state, even in terms of maintaining the existing capabilities, and will create more and more problems over time. The implementation of either scenario depends primarily on the spread of a maritime mind-set. In the case of the black scenario, Estonian maritime geography would continue to be ignored on a governmental and political level, and that includes national defence management. In the case of the positive alternative, national maritime interests would be defined, the management of the maritime sector reorganised, legislations revised, and the necessary reforms implemented to ensure the sovereignty of Estonian sea areas.

Another factor is the national organisation of sea surveillance and the compilation of a recognised maritime picture which is a basis for all maritime operations. With the black scenario, it would remain fragmented between different agencies/authorities and the responsibility of sea surveillance would not be regulated on a legislative level. In case of the white scenario, sea surveillance would be assigned to the Defence Forces and they would compile a recognised maritime picture (in accordance with wartime requirements) with stationary and mobile shore radars and vessels permanently displaying the national flag and identifying targets on Estonian sea areas.

The quality of national maritime tasks depends directly on the organisation of the state fleets and vessels in service. In case of the negative scenario, authorities would continue to operate separate fleets but not be able to fully perform the tasks assigned to them, especially in a crisis and war situations. With the white scenario, on the other hand, a national fleet strategy would be adopted to create balanced fleets capable of operating in both wartime and peacetime. Since many of the existing mismatches of capabilities are related to service vessels and their quantity, the situation in terms of capability mismatches would not improve much with the black scenario. With the white scenario, the capabilities of fleets would improve due to the reduction of ship classes in service, a commission of modular ship classes, and an increase in a cross-use of vessels.

Maritime defence is not necessary only for conventional warfare, but also during peacetime and at different stages of an escalating conflict. In order to

prevent getting defeated in hybrid war and an escalation of a conflict, the state must acquire maritime situational awareness (a recognised maritime picture) and the power to demonstrate national sovereignty. With the black scenario, the situation may escalate rapidly if a crisis should arise; on the other hand, with the white scenario, it is possible to ensure true national deterrence and sovereignty. The great contrast between the two proposed scenarios should, once again, show that ignoring maritime defence problems in Estonia has fatal consequences, and developing proper maritime defence is not an impossible task over a few decades. First, we should stop denying the existence of a maritime domain: only then can the necessary reforms regarding sea surveillance and fleets be carried out, forming a basis for the development of capabilities. To change the prevailing mind-set, we should constantly share the knowledge in the society. The validity of the proposed scenarios will only be revealed over time. The future may fall between both scenarios or be a combination of those two.

Do Small States Need a Balanced Fleet?

Taavi Urb

For a coastal state, the maritime domain presents opportunities as well as dangers that cannot be ignored. To defend its sovereignty and interests at sea, a coastal state needs maritime forces that can at least display its presence at sea and act as a tripwire against definite forces. This becomes especially important at a grey zone between peace and war. For a small state, there is no clear distinction between internal and external security within a maritime domain, and the line between war and peace is becoming increasingly fuzzier. A balanced fleet that is able to operate through a whole conflict spectre and maintain at least some capabilities in all principal warfare areas is the best solution for maintaining the sovereignty of a state and protecting its interests at sea.

To create a balanced fleet, a navy requires a fair share of the (defence) budget. Small states have some inherent problems regarding the establishment and maintenance of a capable fleet, especially shortness of financial and human resources but also lack of knowledge; however, abolishing a navy or degrading it to a niche navy is not an advisable solution. It may seem efficient to sacrifice the protection of national maritime interests, but in no

way does it support an independent defence capability of a state. Avoiding duplications and factionalism, promoting intra- and interstate cooperation and jointness, and combining it with a conscious innovation should make the maintenance of a balanced fleet affordable even for a small state. All in all, there are no credible alternatives to developing a balanced fleet, even for a small coastal state

How Russia Deflects Accusations of Cyberattacks and Disinformation Campaigns: An Analysis of the Rhetorical Strategies of RT

Julius Koppel, Sten Hansson

The Russian Federation uses cyber and information attacks against other countries to achieve its own geopolitical goals. Although the international community has criticised these practices, the Russian government is still trying to deflect blame and justify its actions. To better understand Russia's strategic communication, we analysed the ways in which accusations against Russia for its cyber and information attacks are depicted in Russia's primary government-funded international news portal RT.com. Our analysis revealed that blame for Russia's cyber and information attacks is deflected in the articles published by RT in four main ways: (1) accusations are depicted as groundless and lacking evidence, (2) the accusers are cast as malicious and Russia as the victim, (3) the accusers are portrayed as unreliable or ridiculous, and (4) the attention of readers is distracted away from the accusations.

Antithetical Identity Formation in the Strategic Narratives of the Russian Federation

Daniel Tamm

This article serves three main goals. The first goal is largely theoretical as the article seeks to develop an original framework of analysis, connecting collective identity formation with strategic narratives.

According to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe from the Essex School of Discourse Analysis, political identities always entail a form of antagonism, a type of exclusion. Connecting this notion with the framework of the Tartu–Moscow Semiotic School allows me to delineate how the nature of such an exclusion can be used to interpret the goals of these narratives. In the present case, I will focus my efforts on antithetical identity: the idea of a collective “self” being first and foremost perceived in relation with its polar opposite. As a strategic narrative, antithetical identity formation entails a specific form of projection: the image of an enemy is first created internally and then used to consolidate the power of a given hegemon.

The second goal of the article is to demonstrate the ways in which an antithetical identity formation can become dangerous to others and how this threat can be dealt with. First, I will outline the ways in which the discursive strategies of 1) semiotic disarming, 2) discursive mimicry, 3) preventive projection, 4) moral victimisation, and 5) justified aggression are used to legitimate attacks against alleged adversaries and as a means to avoid blame. Then, I will illustrate how an antithetical identity can lead to a security dilemma and how this can be alleviated by applying an inverted reading model of the narrative.

The third goal of the article is to argue that the forces guiding Russian foreign policy towards the West can be better understood through the lens of an antithetical identity formation. Relying on numerous secondary sources, I will investigate the strategic narratives of 1) “the Russophobic West”, 2) Russia as a “besieged fortress”, and 3) Russia as the ruler of the “Russian world”. Drawing from these, I will interpret the narratives of 4) “Ukraine as a fascist state”, and 5) “the European Union in decay” that have been used to justify Russian aggression towards the two

Countering Russian Information Influence in the Baltic States: A Comparison of Approaches Adopted in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania

Johannes Voltri

In the recent years, numerous studies have been published on information influence activities such as mis- and disinformation or inauthentic behaviour on social media, mainly concerning their prevalence, characteristics, and causes. Yet, comprehensive research on the manner in which governments manage this “information disorder” has remained largely on the sidelines, contributing to a lack of knowledge when it comes to adequate responses to information influence activities. This study seeks to contribute to relevant literature by focusing on the responses of the Baltic States to Russian information influence.

The main objective of this article is to examine and compare Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian governmental responses to Russian information influence activities. In order to obtain a comprehensive understanding on the ways in which the Baltic States have dealt with information influence in general and which countermeasures the three countries have undertaken, focusing on the setup of strategic communication, media literacy in formal education, and media policy, the author of this article analysed the main strategic documents and interviewed state officials. In order to make sense of various strategies that different democracies might opt for, the author used the analytical framework proposed by Hellman and Wagnsson (2017). The research focuses on governmental action, excluding the activities of the media and the third sector, such as independent fact-checking or educational projects.

The author argues that although the approach adopted by the Baltic States to counter the Russian information influence is generally quite similar, the three countries have different understandings about the extent to which the state should regulate the media to achieve its goals. Latvia and Lithuania seek to actively shape the media environment, either through supporting the media to encourage media literacy and raise awareness, or by restricting access to Russian television channels to respond to the incitements of hatred. Estonia, on the other hand, decided to develop its own Russian-language public media as an alternative to the Russian information space that is still influential.

Inventing Military History Teaching in Estonian Military Education 1919–1940: Approaches, Tools, and Methods

Igor Kopõtin

Teaching military history disciplines have played a significant role in Estonian military education. Its foundations were established by Aleksei Baiov, a Russian émigré teacher and a former professor of the Russian General Staff Academy. It is also important to consider the changes proposed by Lieutenant General Nikolai Reek, an Estonian Chief of General Staff, pertaining to the teaching of military history. As a result of Reek's activities, military history disciplines and their content were reshaped, military history assignments were established, and the relationship between military history and other branches of military science were clarified, subjecting military history to the needs of tactical training.

When he was establishing the grounds of the Estonian military education system, Reek had no choice but to use Baiov and other Russian émigré teachers since there were not many ethnic Estonian specialists in this area. Despite the fact that Reek personally invited Baiov, a conflict quickly emerged between the two men. Although, in the military sphere, they had a different academic aptitude and calibre, their conflict is now part of the legacy of the Nicholas General Staff Academy. On the one hand, Baiov stood out in Estonia for his professionalism, but on the other hand, he represented the older generation of Russian military theorists. From a positive viewpoint, that generation valued systematic research and teaching of military history; from a negative viewpoint, it was hardly connected with modern warfare. It can even be said that Reek played the role of a progressive for the younger generation of Russian military theorists since he saw a fundamental need to modernise military history and its teaching. According to Reek, it should have focused more on studying and teaching modern armed conflicts since the earlier history of the art of war was merely necessary to establish a context for the knowledge.

One of the progressive doings of Reek was modernising the teaching of military history through the use of active methods to engage with the audience more personally. He preferred an analysis of military history to mere factual knowledge. Still, military history continued to be taught in a lecture format until mid-1930s; students' independent and group analysis was not

highly appreciated. In addition, the teaching of military history depended on a lecturer's ability to make the subject attractive to students.

The Estonian United Military Educational Institutions (UMEI) took a serious approach to military history subjects since their teachers, especially in the Staff Officer's School, were mostly recognised senior officers who comprised the intellectual elite of the Estonian military. Even though some of them had had earlier experience with pedagogy, none was a historian by education. This was something that maybe made it more difficult to plan and carry out teaching activities, not to mention developing a conception of the need for military history. Developing a competency on military history was also rendered difficult because, unlike active duty, military history was not considered a promising aspect for officers making a career. Therefore, teaching military history remained more of a hobby of senior officers.

In general, we can conclude that despite the criticism, the volume of military history subjects in UMEI did not change over the years. However, the distribution of military history subjects did change. It is now clear that Baiov also shaped the principles of teaching military history disciplines. Although Reek took a strong stance against Baiov, he did not succeed in changing the principles for teaching military history disciplines. It can be said that those of Baiov (i.e. concepts and frameworks developed at the Nicholas General Staff Academy) remained salient until the Estonian military was destroyed in 1940. A positive outcome of Reek's work is probably approaching the history of two conflicts that had only recently ended, World War I and the War of Independence, as separate subjects. Thus, dividing the art of war into three subjects did not change the overall volume of military history in the curriculum but it did increase the share of contemporary conflicts in it.

In the future, it is worth considering a study of teaching and research of military history in the context of Estonian military planning to better understand its influence on military planning. Compared to the development of other European militaries, we can see how unique the problem of teaching military history was in Estonian military education during the interwar period. A brief digression into the teaching of military history in the Red Army shows that the intergenerational conflict was also salient in the 1920s in the neighbouring Soviet Union.